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FOREWORD

Zaire, the second largest country in sub-Saharan Africa, has been politically troubled during many of the years since independence in 1960. It has consistently sought close ties to the United States. Many observers, including opponents of the present government, frequently assert that the perception of U.S. support is a key factor in keeping Zaire's current leadership in power.

The flow of U.S. assistance to Zaire has been relatively modest in monetary terms. American frustrations over Zaire's chronic record of economic mismanagement, abuses of civil liberties, and deprivation suffered by the average citizen—what has been called "the Zairian sickness"—have limited U.S. development assistance to Zaire and led to a steady decrease in security assistance.

The Reagan Administration has recently proposed increases in economic and security assistance for Zaire, including a new program of Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid in Fiscal Year 1983. In Congressional presentations, the Administration has placed special emphasis upon Zaire as a strategically located friendly country and an important supplier of several scarce strategic minerals—particularly cobalt.

Committee staff traveled to Zaire to gain a better understanding of the context for the still-evolving relationship between our two countries, including an assessment of political and economic stability in one of the most populous countries in sub-Saharan Africa. During August, discussions were held in Kinshasa and several locations in Shaba and other provinces with United States and Zairian Government officials, mining experts and non-governmental experts. This report was prepared by Alison Rosenberg, David Lawther Johnson, and Philip Christenson, and reflects information available when submitted in March 1982.

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Chairman.

CLAIBORNE PELL,
Ranking minority member.

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I. Political Situation

(A) BACKGROUND

Zaire's history of continuing political division arises from basic facts of geography and diversity. Zaire encompasses an enormous area of nearly one million square miles. Its population of 27.5 million is splintered into more than 200 distinct ethnic groups. Zaire's southeastern Shaba Province (formerly Katanga) provides most of the country's copper, cobalt, and zinc mining and, as such, the basis for much of the national economy. The bloody struggle for control of this rich area dominated Zaire's first years of independence from Belgium in the early 1960's. Subsequently, Shaban dissidents and exiles have sought to revolt against the central government by taking control of the province on several occasions—most recently in 1977 and 1978.

Today in Lubumbashi, the provincial capital of Shaba, the road from the airport is marked with large billboards proclaiming Zaire's President Mobutu Sese-Seko as "our sole guide" to national strength and prosperity. But Mobutu, who came to power at the head of a coup in 1965, has never been regarded as a popular leader. Instead, Mobutu has relied upon his remarkable skills to manipulate the many contending forces in Zaire—political dissidence, secession movements, a perennially collapsing economy—and to emerge somehow stronger than ever.

(B) MOBUTU'S LEADERSHIP STYLE

Critics charge that much of Mobutu's drive for control stems from sheer greed. It is widely accepted that he has managed to amass a legendary personal fortune at the nation's expense. Nguza Karl-I-Bond, Zaire's former prime minister and current leading self-exiled dissident, has asserted that secret internal investigations showed Mobutu draining more than an average of $50 million annually in scarce foreign exchange from the National Bank of Zaire during 1977–1979. In an appearance before a House subcommittee hearing, Nguza recalled learning, as prime minister, that $30 million in Belgian francs was being transferred by the Bank of Zaire to the president's personal account. Nguza also alleged that Mobutu regularly viewed the nation's business as his own, and took steps such as ordering Zaire's mining companies to sell 20,000 tons of copper abroad for his personal profit.

Other observers charge that Mobutu's "family" of political and military advisers have acquired the habit of corruption. Over the years, there have been frequent revelations that high-ranking members of the civil service and the military have collected salaries for fictitious individuals fraudulently listed on army rosters and government employment rolls.

Staff saw many telling signs of Mobutu's style of "personal" rule. Officials at Gecamines—Zaire's nationalized mining company—had recently been ordered to report regularly and directly to Mobutu, rather than to the minister of economic affairs or the governor-general of the National Bank of Zaire.

During a visit to Gecamines, staff learned that the company's marketing is handled by Sozacom, Zaire's state sales board. After deducting freight costs and sales commissions, Sozacom is supposed to return an average of 45 percent of its revenues to Gecamines. However, officials at Gecamines said that they had no access to information regarding Sozacom's sales and, thus, no way of verifying receipts.

Staff also visited the military airfield in Kinshasa. The United States has provided seven C–130 transport aircraft, one of which was destroyed in a crash. Of the six remaining, only two were operational on the day of the visit.[1] One was Mobutu's personal plane, purchased with FMS credits in 1977 but outfitted with a special "executive capsule" permanently installed at the president's own expense. The complete and comfortable presidential quarters have left little cargo space on the aircraft for cargo or military-related equipment. Mobutu employs the aircraft frequently and has even learned how to fly it. The other operational C–130 was loading a cargo of cattle for livestock breeding. However, staff was later told that this particular mission probably had a private objective—to transport the cattle to Mobutu's ranch for improving the quality of his own herd.[2]

On the other hand, the increase and improvement of Mobutu's personal livestock seems to contribute little to Zaire's economic and social development. Further, Section 4(a), while allowing a variety of uses for FMS-supplied equipment, also requires that "such civic action activities not significantly detract from the capability of the military forces to perform their military missions and be coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social development effort." Had there been a military crisis at some distance from the capital on the day of our visit none of the regular Kinshasa brigade—except President Mobutu—could have been mobilized and flown to the site.

Beyond an observed desire for personal profit, Mobutu has other reasons for seeking to maintain strong control. Having taken power at the head of a coup, Mobutu has always guarded against affording opportunities for potential opposition. There have been constant charges over the years that Mobutu has filled Zaire's jails with real and purported dissidents. A widely circulated open letter, issued by several Zairian MP's in early 1981 and critical of the Mobutu regime, resulted in each official's removal from office and exile to provincial villages.

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[1] Two C–130's were grounded because of crash damage and lack of spare parts. Another was in preparation to be sent to Italy, where the Zairian Government had awarded an Italian company with the general servicing contract on all of its C–130's. Another C–130 was already in Italy being serviced. U.S. personnel and local Lockheed technical representatives agreed that the Italian servicing contract often frustrates Zaire's heavy and constant demand for the C–130 aircraft. With a widely scattered army and no reliable overland routes, the C–130 is ideally suited for Zaire's troops and paratroops.

[2] On the one hand, it could be argued that Mobutu's personal deployment of his C–130's is not a total diversion of the FMS-supplied aircraft for inappropriate purposes. Mobutu heads the armed forces as well as the government, and it could be asserted that his specially outfitted C–130 serves as a command module in times of crisis. Also, in the case of the C–130 transporting cattle, versatility in use is one factor behind the enormous popularity of the C–130 aircraft in developing countries like Zaire. Versatility is recognized in Section 4(a) of the Arms Export Control Act, which authorizes foreign military sales and specifically allows transfers "for the purpose of enabling foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries."

Even among his closest advisers, the President has ordered approximately 20 cabinet shake-ups in 17 years in office. The latest shuffle came in October 1981, and resulted in the removal of Bomboko Lokumba, Mobutu's chief deputy and principal government spokesman. Bomboko is a prime example of a key government official who has been in and out of power over the years.

It has been claimed that no Zairian official has ever remained in a job long enough to become a threat to Mobutu's authority or to perform his duties effectively. U.S. officials indicated to staff that the high turnover among Zairian officials meant that there was little difficulty in gaining Zairian approval of aid projects as proposed by our Embassy. No Zairian official had gained the expertise to evaluate a proposal. For the same reason, none remained long enough to implement the projects to which they had assented.

Mobutu's drive to forge a united Zaire under his control is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the construction of the Inga-Shaba power project. Staff separately toured the impressive Inga power-transmitting and the Shaba power-receiving sites of the project—a project originally planned to serve as a permanent lifeline across Zaire. The line was designed to bring power from the Inga Dam, near Kinshasa on the Zaire (Congo) River, to the mines of Shaba Province 1,100 miles away. Potential obstacles were considerable. Virtually all of the materials and machinery had to be imported through Zaire's Atlantic port of Matadi and transported across the often uncharted interior of Zaire. Thousands of miles of access roads, as well as a construction village at the Shaba site, had to be built. The project was future-oriented, since Shaba had sufficient local hydroelectric resources when construction commenced in 1974. Those power resources remain sufficient today. However, the 1974 market price of copper was high, and Zaire's optimistic government envisioned a doubling of mining activities in Shaba.

Seven years and many cost overruns later, Inga-Shaba is virtually complete, at a cost of nearly $1 billion, of which $400 million was financed by a combination of loans and guarantees from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. However, the power facility has no present (or presently predictable) use. Plummeting copper prices, the high cost of mining operations in Zaire due to an artificially high exchange rate, and eroding investor confidence under present politico-economic conditions have blocked the planned mining expansion. Especially frustrating to many observers is the fact that, while the line has no end use, many isolated areas and facilities along its path could readily employ the power. However, only direct electric current can flow the distance from Inga Dam to Shaba Province, precluding its use enroute and necessitating a transformer outside Lubumbashi to convert the power into alternating current for consumption. The Shaba transformer is now complete, but similar transformers along the line would cost millions of dollars apiece and currently none are planned. The power generators at Inga, only 10 years old, show visible signs of neglect.

(C) SIGNS OF STRAIN

Periodically, Zaire's political tensions, exemplified and exacerbated by Mobutu's style of strong personal rule, become especially obvious. Zaire was undergoing a time of such tension last August.

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Shortly before staff arrived in Kinshasa, Mobutu's heavily guarded presidential palace had been vandalized. As a part of his effort to "Africanize" Zaire away from its colonial past, Mobutu typically appears in public with a ceremonial walking stick and a leopard-skin cap. In an action reminiscent of a different type of African tradition—a ritualistic warning of impending violence—these presidential objects had been stolen and blood poured around Mobutu's office. The break-in thus had an impact far more symbolic than pecuniary.

By August 8, there were widespread reports that Mobutu had mobilized his French-commanded garrison in Kinshasa and increased security at key points, including the presidential palace. The government initially denied all stories of military deployment. Then, a week later, the government acknowledged that there had been heightened security as part of a "mock maneuver" for the Zairian forces to test their "combat readiness." Subsequently, there have been additional press reports of Zairian troops rounding up thousands of unemployed youths in Kinshasa's slums and placing them in preventive detention.

Mobutu's military, relied upon for security in instances such as this, is also a potential source of insecurity for a government which could be directly threatened by any well organized opposition. In one sense, Mobutu has little to fear from the military because it would be difficult for anyone—for any purpose—to mobilize Zaire's far-flung army of 60,000. Zaire's armed forces suffer from the same problems that have crippled much of Zaire's economy—inadequate transport, few roads in good repair, negligible fuel reserves, a shortage of technically trained manpower, frequent rotation of senior officials, and a scarcity (or diversion) of government revenues needed for regular paychecks. Zairian military personnel assigned to protect the American Embassy receive training, food, and pay through the offices of the American Embassy.

There are frequent reports that officers regularly pocket the military payroll and that the soldiers, in turn, are relegated to living off the land by victimizing the local population. One staff member, traveling from Matadi to Kinshasa by road, passed through an unofficial checkpoint where soldiers at night had placed junked vehicles across the road to stop traffic for a "documents check." Since few of Zaire's 26 million population have adequate documents (attributed by some to government inefficiency), they are subject to "fines" collected on the spot. Such checkpoints are seen as necessary sources of income for soldiers whose real pay may be less than 30 cents U.S. per day (when paid).

As bad as the military situation may be, some critics have concluded that Mobutu deliberately seeks to frustrate real improvement or even to make it worse. In this view, Mobutu believes that strength at the top is best preserved by perpetuating weakness at the bottom. Thus, as with his cabinet, Mobutu has a benign view of corruption and engages in regular military personnel shifts and sackings. The latest occurred in July 1981, and resulted in a confusing rotation of key commanders from Zaire's military districts.

It is direct outside assistance which provides the little order that exists for Zaire's military. The French support the 31st Brigade and 31st Parachute Brigade in Kinshasa. Widely regarded as Zaire's leading army unit, the 31st Brigade is unique in having foreigners in

command as well as in coordination positions. Similarly, the 31st Paratroop Brigade is equipped and commanded by French military personnel.

In Shaba Province, Belgium has assumed responsibility for training Zaire's 2,500-man 21st Brigade. However, the Belgian commitment, including approximately 20 advisers, is less extensive than the French, and the 21st is commanded by Zairians.

The Chinese have sent approximately 40 trainers and advisers to Zaire and have worked to instruct a "shock force brigade" at Kisangani in the north. Staff was told that the Chinese efforts are still in the beginning stages and have met with only mixed results.

In all, most observers of Zaire's military situation have concluded that those Zairian units which perform best are also those with the greatest number and involvement of foreign advisers. As the foreign presence declines, so do the acquired skills and efficiency.

Staff was told that part of the difficulty is that Zaire has never developed a cadre of indigenous trainers to build upon the work of foreign military experts. Some believe that such a shortage of local skills is, again, deliberately perpetuated. They conclude that Mobutu is interested in maintaining an army strong enough to support him initially or in a minor disturbance, but never so strong that major crises will not require outside support.

One U.S. official noted that Mobutu's power rests in part on the appearance of having powerful friends; thus he may prefer to have French, Belgian, and Chinese military advisers and commanders to well-qualified Zairian commanders. Conspicuous evidence of Western support has a symbolic value which far exceeds the actual number of foreign personnel involved. The "tripwire" presence of these personnel represents the assurance of foreign intervention during a crisis.

In short, foreign military intervention for Mobutu remains more prestigious and reliable, less expensive, and far less challenging to his leadership than a well commanded and organized military program within Zaire. Any belief which Mobutu may have in this regard could only have been confirmed by the experience of the two Shaba conflicts in 1977 and 1978, when Zairian regulars crumbled. It was the eventual intervention by the French, Belgians, Egyptians, Moroccans, and Americans which saved the day.

Early in 1981 Mobutu began to doubt several of his main sources of crucial outside support. The new French government of Francois Mitterand has articulated an African policy which emphasizes development assistance while seeking to distance France from its traditional role of military intervention in African countries. The difference for Mobutu was made clear in the midst of his other difficulties in the summer of 1981. In August he had a long meeting with visiting President David Dacko of the Central African Republic (CAR). The two leaders met to coordinate security strategy—a strategy in which both countries have dependent heavily upon active French support. The French military were widely credited with returning Dacko to power in the CAR in 1978 and deposing the infamous Emperior Bokassa. However, shortly after his meeting with Mobutu, Dacko himself was unseated. In July, Dacko had moved to put down internal disorder by declaring a state of siege and dissolving opposition political par-

ties—actions which reportedly displeased Paris. While the CAR military took over with the official explanation that Dacko had resigned because of ill health, many observers suggest that the coup could hardly have occurred without French knowledge and approval.

Mobutu has received signals of a French desire for greater distance. The Mitterand government delayed inviting Mobutu for an official visit, and it transferred the site for a summit of French and African leaders from Kinshasa to Paris. The Mitterand government has renewed the pledge to train and equip Zaire's 31st Brigade, but beyond this promise, France's military commitment to Zaire is undefined. Many observers suggest that Mobutu can no longer feel assured that in the event of a renewed conflict in Shaba Province, or even in Kinshasa, French troops would intervene to preserve his government.

At the same time, Mobutu has had difficulties with Belgium, Zaire's former colonial power. The Belgians have resisted increasing military assistance to Zaire and are widely believed to be unwilling to intervene militarily in the event of another domestic crisis. Moreover, the Belgians have granted asylum to Mobutu's harshest critic, former prime minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond. Nguza has called for Mobutu's downfall with increasing stridency. Anxious over reports that Nguza found a receptive audience in Belgium, Mobutu at one point threatened to sever diplomatic ties unless Nguza's pronouncements ceased. The crisis passed, and Nguza continues to speak out against Mobutu from safety in Belgium.

Frustrated by developments among his traditional sources of support, Mobutu has sought to enhance his international standing in other quarters. Zaire is reported to have promised "material aid" to dissident groups such as the African National Congress of South Africa. Mobutu recently hosted the annual meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee, dealing with issues of independence and black majority rule in southern Africa. Along with Nigeria and Senegal, Zaire sent troops to Chad as part of the OAU peacekeeping force. In a surprise action, Mobutu reportedly even suggested, during his recent U.S. visit, that Zaire would consider restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, broken since 1973.

Most of all, Mobutu has looked to the United States for increased material and moral support. In December 1981, Mobutu made a "private visit" to the United States, in part to strengthen perceptions at home that he has powerful friends abroad. In addition, Mobutu sought to convey the message that Zaire has emerged as a strong and strategic ally of the West. In Mobutu's view, such importance entitles Zaire to expect further, significant assistance and to be treated as one of America's "real friends."

Shortly after Mobutu's visit, the United States did contribute $12 million to the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad, mostly to underwrite the activities of the Zairian and Nigerian contingents. The Administration's FY 1983 aid request of $36.3 million for Zaire (compared to $11.5 million for FY 1982) is still unlikely to match Mobutu expectations.

With Mobutu's position often tense at home and tenuous abroad, some observers conclude that Zaire will soon be faced with a political crisis. Others point out that such predictions have often been made before, and that Mobutu has always survived because there is no one

strong enough to succeed in toppling him. They would also point out that his government's excesses have been tolerated because he has maintained relative peace after the bloody chaos which followed independence from Belgian colonial rule in 1960. In this view, there is no one besides Mobutu who could hold Zaire together, even to the limited extent that Mobutu has achieved. Also, it is contended, under Mobutu's domination of politics, strong and effective opposition has failed to materialize and remains concentrated in exile communities. What can be safely concluded is that the prospects for radical change in Zaire—and indeed the possibilities for any particular future direction, including perpetuation of the status quo—cannot be confidently predicted.

II. Economic Situation

(A) BACKGROUND

With Zaire's resource base, it should be possible for Mobutu to offset his political troubles by building a strong economy. The country has extensive and varied mineral deposits, half of Africa's hardwood forests, a formerly thriving agricultural sector, and vast hydroelectric potential. Yet Zaire's recent economic history has been plagued by serious financial and administrative difficulties.

Between 1968 and 1974, Zaire's economy grew at an annual rate of 7 percent. During the 1971–1974 period of high copper prices, Zaire embarked on a costly industrial expansion program and engaged in a number of expensive prestige projects, financed largely by heavy borrowing from foreign private banks. During this brief economic surge, Mobutu decreed the "Zairianization" and "radicalization" of foreign-held enterprises (except certain large enterprises) without compensation to owners. This move resulted in turning over to well-connected Zairians most of the trading companies and foreign-owned plantations. Some of the owners were confined to refugee camps and forbidden to leave Zaire. A couple of years later, Mobutu announced that this program had been a failure and that these enterprises were to be de-Zairianized and de-radicalized. Firms returned to their former owners had been severely mismanaged. Some of the Zairian owners had simply sold off the existing stock, pocketed the proceeds, and abandoned the firm. Many of the expatriate former owners refused to return to the properties, and those who did now make only minimal capital investments.

With the non-mining sectors of the economy crippled, Mobutu's regime came to rely increasingly upon Shaba Province's enormously rich copper mines. During 1974, copper prices began to fall from their record levels, leaving Zaire unable to meet its expanding foreign debt service obligations. Zaire has continued to depend on mineral revenues for 65–70 percent of its hard currency. The percentage of export revenues going to debt service has increased in recent years to a little less than 25 percent in 1981.

Government mismanagement and, again, alleged corruption have only served to compound Zaire's problems. For example, in 1978 outlays for items other than debt service exceeded the budget by 77 percent. Expenditures by the President's office—including *donations* (gifts), which cynics describe as loyalty payments to political allies—exceeded

budget allocations by 37 percent. At the same time, vitally needed investments in agriculture infrastructure, public works, and transport were virtually ignored, except for high-visibility projects such as the Inga-Shaba power line, discussed above.

The average Zairian citizen has been the major victim of the country's economic situation. Real wages have declined steadily and dramatically. For farmers, real agricultural prices were lower in 1974 than at independence. In 1980 workers in private industry earned a median income of 170 zaires per month, less than half the cost of feeding an average family of six. The official exchange rate ($1=5.5 zaires) is approximately half of the black (free) market rate.

Transport needs of the mining industry have become particularly acute. Shipping via the national rail-river-rail link to the Zairian port of Matadi consumes approximately 65 days. Routes through South Africa require less than half that time but impose a requirement that 85 percent of transport costs be paid in foreign exchange. Guerrilla attacks have destroyed the reliability of the Benguela Railway through Angola, which once permitted export transport in as little as 10 days. At the moment, most shipping is divided between the national and southern routes, and even with depressed prices, Zaire's exports do not match demand. Officials at the Gecamines Company, in Shaba Province, stated that the national mining corporation could have sold an additional $23 million in copper and $13 million in zinc to foreign markets in 1981 if adequate transport had been available.

(B) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

To cope with at least some of the problems of mismanagement and misuse of funds, outside experts have been placed in two important government entities. Since 1978 an IMF adviser has served as a principal director of the Bank of Zaire, and in late 1980 a team of Belgian advisers began assisting in reforming the customs service in Kinshasa to reduce irregularities.

Since 1976, Zaire's principal creditors—the so-called "Paris Club"—have met annually to reschedule the country's official debts. In April 1980, Zaire's private bank creditors—the "London Club"—agreed to reschedule payments of unofficial debt.

By August 1981, international officials had found several small but significant reasons for hope that Zaire's economy may improve.

In 1980, Zaire achieved its first year of economic growth (1.8 percent) since 1975.

From 1978 to 1980, inflation dropped from an annual rate of 100 percent to approximately 50 percent.

For three successive quarters in 1980, Zaire was able to honor all of its rescheduled debt payments.

In late June 1981, the Consultative Group of Zaire's principal donors, organized by the World Bank, arrived at a generally favorable assessment of Zaire's recent economic developments. In July, the Paris Club agreed to reschedule Zaire's medium- and long-term debts falling due in 1981 and 1982.

In Jume 1981, Zaire also qualified for an IMF Extended Fund Facility, whereby $1.1 billion would be disbursed in several installments through 1983. This was the largest IMF loan to date to an

African country. The assistance was designed to allow Zaire to import primary materials and spare parts crucial to revitalizing industry, which has been operating at only 30 percent capacity.

Wary over Zaire's reported corruption, the Fund sought closer monitoring of government revenues. The IMF agreement called for economic reforms, especially in government budget procedures, controls over credit and money supply, and the pricing of goods and services. In the past, Zaire has proved unable or unwilling to adhere to IMF guidelines. This time, IMF officials were cautiously optimistic that things might be different.

Although Mobutu continues publicly and privately to support the IMF agreement, by October 1981 Zaire had again failed to comply with IMF objectives. Excessive public spending with unexpectedly low government revenues led Zaire to exceed IMF-mandated credit ceilings and budgetary restraints. Relations between the IMF and Zaire are currently in flux, with both sides hopeful that some new agreement can be reached. Of course, any new standby agreement is likely to impose even more stringent conditions.

U.S. experts warn that in the immediate future, Zaire will continue to experience serious problems stemming from increased debt service payments and chronically unstable prices for major exports. Projections for 1982 indicate that world copper prices will remain low and that Zaire's cobalt prices (which had soared from $5.58 to $25 a pound after the 1978 Shaba invasion) will remain near present levels of $17. At a time when more of Zaire's debts are coming due, requests for a new round of debt rescheduling are thus a strong possibility.

(C) U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

In 1981, U.S. develop ıent assistance to Zaire totaled $9.4 million, with an additional $10 million in Public Law 480 Title I commodity imports. The Agency for International Development conducts programs in agriculture and transport infrastructure, health, nutrition, and manpower development in Zaire.

Staff had the opportunity to visit a major AID agricultural development effort, Project North Shaba. Prior to independence, northern Shaba had produced a surplus of food for export to the mining communities in the southern part of the province. Since independence, production has lapsed and the transport infrastructure has substantially deteriorated.

Project North Shaba (PNS) has two stated goals: (1) to raise farmer income by the end of the project (September 1983) through increasing annual corn production; and (2) to establish a model for rural development elsewhere in Zaire. This highly ambitious project covers an area of approximately 15,000 square kilometers and involves the rehabilitation of 724 kilometers of previously abandoned roads. It also involves the development of a number of other "subsystems" in research and training, production and sale of tools, marketing, organization of small farmer groups, and evaluation. At the time of the visit, project directors were claiming a good deal of success but acknowledged that problems in many areas remained, including shortages of supplies and transport. At one rail station, for example, hundreds of sacks of maize had piled up awaiting shipment because of a shortage of train cars. Further, a scarcity of sacks prevented farmers from bringing additional grain for sale.

PNS has brought distinct improvements in the regional agricultural picture. According to AID officials, maize production had increased from 35,000 tons in 1980 to 69,000 tons in 1981. Farmers were able to transport and market more of their maize themselves at the railhead. In this way, they received the markup that would otherwise have gone to the merchant (amounting to a 30 percent price increase for 55,000 tons). Mobutu regards PNS as a high prestige project, showing the president's ability to deliver tangible American aid to the rural poor in a troubled area. Consequently, far from being encouraged by Zaire to consolidate PNS, AID officials are under pressure to expand operations even further. However, staff was struck by the enormous domestic economic and administrative burden which this project will present after the United States has phased out its involvement. Zaire's serious budgetary troubles, coupled with the government's record of administrative mismanagement and neglect, left staff wondering how long PNS and its various subsystems can be properly maintained.

Another project visited, the Cassava Outreach agriculture research station at M'vuazi, illustrated vividly problems in the Zairian government. The station was originally a Belgian research station and was turned over as a fully equipped, operating entity at independence. By August 1981, the buildings and equipment had somehow been stripped of anything of value that was sufficiently portable. Under contract with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, AID is seeking to restore the project to effectiveness. The principal concern of the Zairian staff assigned to the project was that at the expiration of the AID funds, they would no longer receive their already meager salaries from the Zairian Government ($70 a month for a U.S. trained agronomist). Tensions between the third country nationals (mostly South Asians) assigned by IITA to the project who were receiving expatriate salaries and equally qualified Zairians were quite evident during the visit. Agricultural research is by nature a very long-term venture requiring a long-term commitment of resources. If the past is a guide to the future, the project could be neglected again once USAID involvement is withdrawn.

III. Conclusions for U.S. Policy

With regard to the appropriate U.S. policy response, a visit to Zaire raises difficult questions centering around several main themes.

Specifically, in the area of *U.S. development assistance* to Zaire, staff concluded the following:

(1) Zaire's supporters may have conveyed a signal that the West is prepared to tolerate indefinitely Zaire's economic inadequacies and abuses. In the past, multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as private banks, have repeatedly proved willing to provide assistance to Zaire and to reschedule that country's escalating debt. There is a need to clarify, within Western policymaking processes, the limits to our acceptance of continued Zairian excesses. Mobutu's initial receptivity to IMF-mandated reforms indicates Zaire's potential responsiveness to such a pointed message from the international community.

(2) An American consensus about the limits of our involvement with Mobutu is the first step in bringing adequate pressure on his government to make the necessary reforms. Unless such limits are clearly conveyed, Mobutu will be unlikely to make reforms because the more effectively public expenditures are controlled and corruption

curtailed, the more likely Mobutu's support from beneficiaries of a corrupt system will be jeopardized.

(3) Although several of Zaire's economic indicators (GNP, inflation rate, debt repayments) have recently improved somewhat, the legacy of economic mismanagement and incompetence continues for Zaire's general population. While their standard of living has plummeted since independence, citizens continue to hear reports of Mobutu and his favored associates growing steadily wealthier. There is a real question whether the government has the resolve, as well as the resources, for a development program which works effectively to improve the quality of life in Zaire.

(4) With a passivity mystifying to outside observers, Zaire's citizens thus far have endured large-scale deprivation. But logic dictates that popular resentment must eventually manifest itself in some significant way unless the tide turns. While the nature or timing of future changes cannot be confidently predicted, it is increasingly risky for the United States to expect perpetuation of the status quo.

(5) It may be unrealistic to expect that U.S. development projects handed over to the Zairian Government will be properly maintained. There is little in that government's history to indicate the means or—more important—the will to assume such a responsibility. If this skepticism applies to the continuation of present projects, it most certainly raises questions about the replicability of these projects elsewhere in Zaire.

These findings on the development side lead to similar conclusions for U.S. *security assistance* to Zaire:

(1) Throughout the international community, and by many within Zaire, U.S. assistance efforts have often been interpreted as direct support for Mobutu. Zaire's president has promoted the view that the power of the United States stands behind him. His current drive for enchanced U.S. security assistance arises from the need to give credibility to this claim.

(2) If Mobutu's personal fortune is anywhere near that claimed by both critics and supporters, he could easily replace from his own resources the entire U.S. security assistance program. What is apparently important to Mobutu is not financial assistance *per se*, but financial assistance from the United States.

(3) Moreover, identification with the United States is especially important to Mobutu at a time when other traditional sources of Western support—France and Belgium—appear to be seeking to distance themselves, at least symbolically, from his government.

(4) These factors suggest a serious policy problem for the United States: In the event of a future emergency—for example, another crisis in Shaba Province—it could easily be this country to whom Zaire turns to intervene and carry the day.

(5) Mobutu's controversial style of personal rule makes it difficult to define Zaire's present and future political direction. Given this fundamental uncertainty, and contrary to the perception in many quarters, the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa is pursuing a laudable policy of emphasizing concrete contributions to Zaire's security and development, while downplaying any political endorsement of Mobutu.

However, the Zairian government-controlled media interpret any contact between the United States and the regime as support for Mobutu, even when the United States makes representations strongly critical of the regime's economic or human rights policies. The scope

and detail of Mobutu's involvement in running Zaire inevitably "politicizes" any assistance and hinders efforts to separate aid to Zaire from support for its president. Numerous reports of Mobutu's diversion of public funds only underscore the elusiveness of such a distinction.

(6) U.S. objectives in Zaire remain unclear. The modest commitment of aid funds has not made it appear urgent for the United States to conduct a major policy review or revision. However, the growing symbolic significance attached to the U.S. presence in Zaire makes ambiguity a policy of substantial risk.

(7) U.S. involvement in Zaire has often been justified on the grounds that Zaire is a strategic source of critical minerals. Furthermore, Zaire's vast size and central location on the continent has made it attractive to those seeking to deter Soviet penetration of Africa. Any policy review should include an evaluation of these justifications.

(8) In any event, these factors work to U.S. advantage only if Zaire is sufficiently stable to remain a secure, long-term supplier and cooperative regional power. However artful and tenacious, Mobutu's style of governing has focused on short-term political survival rather than on long-term nation building. If these two objectives are incompatible, the case for active U.S. involvement in Zaire needs to be re-evaluated.

(9) In any event, proposals for increased security assistance to Zaire deserve special scrutiny. Repeated reports of corruption, incompetence, and deliberate sabotage in the economy and the military all raise the issue of whether enhanced assistance can or will be effectively used.

(10) At the same time, without a new policy direction, partial cuts in aid imposed by Congress are unlikely to achieve a meaningful purpose. The symbolic impact of a partial cut is overshadowed by the fact that, so long as the United States provides any security assistance, Mobutu can claim (and does claim) that the United States remains tied to Zaire's defense.

(11) Also, partial cuts can be counterproductive to U.S. security programs already in place. For example, halving security assistance is less likely to curb abuses within the Zairian armed forces than it is to result in a shortage of spare parts and routine maintenance for U.S. equipment previously sent to Zaire.

(12) Thus, one approach to consider is for the United States to spell out those circumstances under which security assistance for Zaire could be significantly increased. Perhaps more important, however, the United States should also make clear that there are conditions under which U.S. support for Zaire could be not only diminished but withdrawn. It may be that the only effective impetus for serious reform in Zaire will be a credible indication of U.S. willingness to disengage entirely.

(13) The United States should not necessarily expect that Zaire's two other major Western donors would be willing to join with us in this step. However, recognizing that U.S. assistance is a top priority for Mobutu, such unity may not be necessary. In any event, Mobutu's ability to respond does not seem to be in doubt since he is a leader who appears able to order government policies to fit personal priorities.

(14) However, such an approach can be effective only if the United States has first defined for itself the expected benefits and unacceptable costs of providing economic and security assistance to Zaire.

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97th Congress
2d Session } COMMITTEE PRINT

THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

A REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

JULY 1982

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., April 19, 1982.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe continues the multilateral process, begun at Helsinki, Finland in 1973, of developing cooperation and building security in Europe. In spite of rising tensions between East and West, the states at Madrid have continued the meeting for more than a year in an effort to reach agreement on a substantive concluding document.

The attached report by Nancy H. Stetson of the Foreign Relations Committee staff is a review of the Madrid meeting. It is based in part on a staff trip to Madrid in December 1981, a time when the states were very close to an agreement.

I believe that the report is informative and useful. The views expressed therein are those of Dr. Stetson and do not necessarily reflect the views of any member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL.

PREFACE

This report is a review of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is based on a staff trip to Madrid during the second week of December 1981 and on discussions with the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and with appropriate officials in the State and Defense Departments. The report discusses the objectives of the states at Madrid; examines both Phase I, the review of implementation of the Final Act, and Phase II, negotiations and drafting, with emphasis on the second session of Phase II; and assesses the prospects for concluding the Madrid meeting with a substantive and balanced document.

I was particularly impressed with the willingness of the states at Madrid to continue negotiations in spite of East-West tensions that have made agreement more difficult to attain. In my view, this willingness reflects the importance attached to the survival of the CSCE process not only by the West but by the East and the neutral and nonaligned states as well.

NANCY H. STETSON.

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SUMMARY

The Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which is the second follow-up to the Helsinki Conference, has two phases. In Phase I (November 11–December 18, 1980), the states conducted a review of implementation of the Final Act. In Phase II, which began on January 27, 1981 and has not yet ended, the states are attempting to reach agreement on a concluding document that would contain new provisions in all areas of the Final Act. Both phases have taken place in an atmosphere of rising East-West tension that has made agreement at Madrid more difficult to attain.

The United States has pursued two objectives at Madrid: to seek a candid review of implementation prior to consideration of new proposals and to ensure the continuation of the CSCE process through the scheduling of another follow-up meeting to be held 2 to 3 years after the Madrid meeting ends. Although the United States has been willing to consider proposals that balance interests in all areas of the Final Act, attaining agreement on a substantive concluding document is viewed as a desirable but not the primary American goal.

The East has attempted to focus the meeting on security issues, in particular confidence-building measures (CBM's) and a post-Madrid European disarmament conference, and to turn attention away from human rights and other controversial issues unrelated to security. The East has presented a united front on security as well as other issues at Madrid in an effort to achieve these objectives.

The rising level of East-West tension and genuine fear of a superpower confrontation among some of the European publics prompted many Western European and neutral and nonaligned states (NNA's) to respond favorably to the Eastern call for a post-Madrid military security conference. While still interested in human rights (traditionally, the most important CSCE issue for the West), these states would like the meeting to produce an agreement that improves upon the Final Act's provisions on security.

The United States is somewhat less enthusiastic than its European allies about a post-Madrid European disarmament conference. American officials are concerned that the Soviet Union may be advocating this proposal as a means of disrupting the NATO alliance; undermining NATO's decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe; diverting attention at Madrid on issues, especially human rights, on which Moscow is vulnerable; and/or diminishing the importance of the CSCE process by dealing with military security issues in a separate forum.

In spite of these reservations, the United States accepted the idea of a post-Madrid military security conference with the conditions that progress is made on human rights and that the conference is

firmly placed within the CSCE framework. American interests in maintaining NATO solidarity and retaining European support for human rights at Madrid are well served by the U.S. endorsement of this idea.

The United States has worked closely with its allies to present a united front on all issues at Madrid. Through the process of developing Western unity, the United States realized that the NATO allies need and deeply want to end the Madrid meeting with a substantive and balanced concluding document. Consequently, American interest in achieving this goal has increased in Phase II.

The neutral and nonaligned states at Madrid have played a vital role as intermediaries between East and West. Their primary objective is to ensure that the CSCE process, which they view as a means of handling East-West tension, continues. Although differences exist among the NNA's, they have worked together fairly effectively to facilitate agreement among the states and particularly between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO delegations.

In Phase I, the West, following American leadership, accused the East of failure to implement the Final Act, especially with respect to human rights. The West also charged that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan undermined détente and violated the Final Act which, in the Western view, applies to non-European areas as well as to Europe. From the American perspective, the review of implementation was both balanced and thorough. Thus, the United States achieved its first objective at Madrid.

The key issues of Phase II are in the areas of security, human rights, and follow-up to the Madrid meeting. The West has continually linked its attendance at a post-Madrid European security conference to Eastern acceptance of new proposals in the area of human rights. The East, however, has been unwilling to accept new obligations in this area until the West yields on security. The West has promised unconditionally to attend a third follow-up meeting. The East, on the other hand, has threatened to disrupt the CSCE process by withholding its commitment to attend until consensus is reached on a post-Madrid European disarmament conference. These linkages have prolonged negotiations and increased the difficulty of reaching agreement.

Failure to resolve these issues deadlocked the meeting at the end of July 1981 (at which time the states had tentatively agreed upon 80–85 percent of the language of a concluding document) and during most of the second session of Phase II, which began in October. In an effort to break the impasse and reach agreement by December 18, when the meeting was scheduled to end, the neutrals, in the second week of December, informally circulated a draft concluding document which contained compromise language designed to bridge the gaps between East and West on both security and human rights.

Although the Western states were favorably disposed toward the security text of the neutral proposal, many of them were disappointed in the human rights provisions. The prevailing opinion in the Western bloc was that the neutral draft did not sufficiently meet Western demands on human rights and, therefore, was not a balanced document. The American delegation, in particular, found the proposal extremely deficient in the human rights area and unacceptable without further modification. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies agreed that

the neutral proposal represented an important initiative which could bring the meeting to a successful conclusion. The Soviet Union and its allies appeared to share this view as well.

As the second week of December drew to a close, the prospects for concluding the meeting with an agreement looked promising. Unfortunately, the imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13 undermined these prospects and ended meaningful negotiations. During the last week of the meeting, while attention was focused on Poland, the only agreement reached was to reconvene in February 1982.

During the third session (February 9–March 12, 1982) the Western states and the NNA's used the meeting as a forum to express outrage over the situation in Poland. The Soviet Union sought to continue negotiations, but the West argued that "business as usual" could not be conducted as long as the Polish situation remained unchanged. In light of the Western position, the states agreed to adjourn the meeting until November 1982.

The international political climate has always had significant impact on the outcome of CSCE proceedings. It is doubtful that the next session will achieve results without major improvements in East-West relations, which presently hinge on the Polish and Afghan situations.

The neutral proposal of December 1981 could serve as the starting point for negotiations in the next session, but it will not have the value that it had when introduced. The states have now had an opportunity to review the proposal and establish demands for changes in the language. Moreover, the pressure to accept the proposal has lessened.

Although a substantive concluding document has not yet been achieved, there have been some significant accomplishments at Madrid. Agreement has been reached on many provisions that would enhance cooperation in economics, science and technology, the environment, culture, education, and even human rights. Western unity at Madrid has been exceptional (and from the Eastern perspective, unexpected) and has contributed to the success achieved thus far in negotiations. This solidarity could spill over to other issues of concern to the Atlantic alliance and possibly inhibit Soviet efforts to exploit differences between the United States and its allies. Finally, the willingness of the states to continue the Madrid meeting in an atmosphere of rising East-West tension reflects the importance that is attached to the survival of the CSCE process.

INTRODUCTION

The Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opened on November 11, 1980. This meeting is the second follow-up to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which began in Helsinki, Finland in July 1973 and concluded in August 1975, with the adoption by thirty-three European states, the United States and Canada of the Final Act, commonly known as the Helsinki Accords.

The Final Act is based on the assumption that security and peace in Europe could be achieved only through an expansion of cooperation among the CSCE states. Through cooperative activities, the distrust and suspicion that characterized East-West relations through most of the post World War II period would presumably be decreased and confidence would be built. Thus, the Final Act was designed to "broaden, deepen and make continuing and lasting the process of détente" which had begun to develop in the late 1960's and early 1970's.[1]

The Act is divided into five areas. The three major areas, generally referred to as "baskets", are: I—security, which includes both a Declaration on Principles guiding interstate relations and provisions on confidence-building measures, disarmament, and certain other aspects of security; II—economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation; and III—humanitarian, informational, cultural and educational cooperation. The other two areas of the Act deal with security and cooperation in the Mediterranean and follow-up to the Helsinki Conference. Follow-up meetings to review compliance with the Act and negotiate new agreements were regarded by the states as necessary to continue the process of developing cooperation and building security in Europe. Therefore, in the Final Act the CSCE states declared that the first follow-up meeting would be held in Belgrade in 1977.

At Belgrade, the states failed to reach agreement on any new provisions in the areas covered by the Final Act. They did, however, hold a thorough review of implementation and ensure the continuation of the CSCE process by determining that the second follow-up would be in Madrid in 1980.

In Phase I of the Madrid meeting (November 11–December 18, 1980), the states conducted a review of implementation of the Final Act. In Phase II, which began on January 27, 1981 and has not yet ended, the states are attempting to achieve consensus on a concluding document that would contain new provisions in all areas of the Final Act.[2]

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[1] Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act.

[2] In the CSCE process, decisionmaking is by "consensus", which means the absence of any objection expressed by a participating state and offered as an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question.

Both phases of the meeting have taken place in an atmosphere of rising East-West tension. The Soviet invasion of and continued presence in Afghanistan; widespread Soviet and Eastern European violations of the Final Act, especially in the area of human rights; the imposition of martial law in Poland; NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, which is viewed by the Soviet Union as a direct threat to the Soviet homeland and a deliberate attempt to tip the European military balance in NATO's favor; and the Reagan Administration's hardline anti-Soviet policies and rhetoric have caused East-West relations to deteriorate, thereby making agreement at Madrid more difficult to attain.

The CSCE states are divided at Madrid, as they were at Helsinki and Belgrade, into three groups reflecting basic political alignments: West, East, and neutral and nonaligned.[3] This report discusses the primary objectives of these groups at Madrid; reviews both phases of the Madrid meeting with emphasis on the second session of Phase II, which staff attended in December; and comments on the outlook for the future.

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[3] Generally, the following states constitute the neutral and nonaligned group: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Malta.

OBJECTIVES OF THE CSCE STATES AT MADRID

The United States

The Carter Administration defined two objectives for the United States at Madrid: to seek a "candid" review of progress in implementation of the Final Act prior to consideration of new proposals and to ensure the continuation of the CSCE process by gaining consensus on the scheduling of another review meeting approximately 2 to 3 years after closure of the Madrid meeting.

These goals, which are shared by the other Western states at Madrid, reflected the Administration's position that credibility of the CSCE process depends on willingness of the states to fulfill obligations under the Final Act and to be held accountable for failure to do so. The Administration indicated that the United States would be willing to consider new proposals that balanced interests in all areas of the Act. However, attaining agreement on a substantive concluding document was not viewed as the primary U.S. goal at Madrid.

The Carter Administration's position at Madrid in 1980 was shaped in part by European and American reactions to the Belgrade meeting. Traditionally, the United States and its allies have viewed human rights as the most important issue in the CSCE context. At Belgrade, the West, under American leadership, focused the review of implementation on Soviet and Eastern European failure to fulfill obligations undertaken in the Final Act in the area of human rights. During this review, the United States adopted a tough approach which was regarded by many Western European and neutral and nonaligned states as confrontational and potentially threatening to the CSCE process (should the East decide to walk out of the meeting).

Although the Soviet Union and its allies did not leave the Belgrade meeting, they refused to agree to any new provisions on human rights. The conclusion was drawn by many in Western Europe and in the United States that the emphasis on human rights during the review of implementation and the hardline American approach were counterproductive. Those holding this view sought an American position at Madrid that would assure both the continuation of the CSCE process and a balanced review of implementation. The Carter Administration designed its position to satisfy these demands as well as the demands of those in the Administration, in Congress, and in the attentive publics who saw Madrid as a forum in which to put strong pressure on the East with respect to human rights.

The Reagan Administration has followed the policy set by the Carter Administration at Madrid. In Phase II, as in Phase I, the United States has demanded compliance with the Final Act, stressed the importance of human rights and the need to preserve the CSCE process, and worked closely with its NATO allies to present a united front. Through the process of developing Western unity, the United

States has come to realize that concluding the meeting with a substantive and balanced document is extremely important to the NATO allies. As a result, American interest in achieving this goal has increased in Phase II.

The East

The Soviet Union and its allies never willingly accepted the Western view that détente embraces human rights and fundamental freedoms. From the Eastern perspective, détente, which is seen as a means of enhancing security, is to be defined in terms of the needs and interests, rights and obligations of states in the international arena only. Given their conception of détente, it is not surprising that the Eastern states have been primarily interested in Basket I of the Final Act.

The East has been determined to focus the Madrid meeting on military security issues and to turn attention away from human rights and other controversial issues unrelated to security. The overriding Soviet goal at Madrid is to achieve consensus on a post-Madrid military security conference that would deal with confidence-building measures and European disarmament.

Even before the Madrid meeting began, the Warsaw Pact declaration of May 1980 invited all the CSCE states to "take a constructive stand on the issue of the conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe, so that the decision on its convocation could be taken at the Madrid meeting." At Madrid, the East has reinforced this approach by presenting a united front on security as well as other issues. Of all the Eastern bloc nations, only one—Romania—has displayed significant independence at Madrid.[4]

The West

The Eastern call for a post-Madrid conference on the military aspects of security attracted the attention of many of the Western and neutral and nonaligned states. The rising level of East-West tension and genuine fear of a superpower confrontation that developed among some of the European publics in 1981 forced Western European governments to focus on security issues. In general, the Western Europeans and the NNA's would like the Madrid meeting to produce a concluding document that improves on the Final Act's security provisions. While still committed to human rights, these nations are seriously interested in the idea of a conference that would deal with confidence-building and disarmament in Europe.

The United States is somewhat less enthusiastic than its European allies about a European disarmament conference that would evolve from the Madrid meeting. From the American perspective, Soviet motives in advocating this proposal are unclear. American officials state that the Soviet Union and its allies could be genuinely interested in the conference or they could be trying to use it as a means of dividing the NATO alliance and undermining NATO's decision to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. Some U.S. officials argue that the Soviet Union is interested in the disarmament conference pri-

[4] Romania was the only Warsaw Pact nation to publicly condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Romania has informally bid to host the next follow-up meeting and has displayed some independence on the question of the post-Madrid military security conference.

marily as a means of diverting attention at Madrid away from human rights and other issues on which Moscow is vulnerable. A major American concern is that emphasis on security issues could overshadow human rights at Madrid. The United States is also troubled by the possibility that the Soviet Union may be seeking to downgrade the importance of the CSCE process by dealing with security issues in a separate forum.

In spite of these reservations, the United States accepted the idea of a post-Madrid military security conference on two conditions: that progress is made on human rights and that the conference is firmly placed within the CSCE framework. Under the Carter Administration, the United States joined its NATO allies at the June 1980 NATO summit meeting in Ankara in endorsing a French proposal for a conference on CBM's that would be part of the CSCE process. Shortly after Phase II began, the Reagan Administration reiterated U.S. support for this proposal and indicated a willingness to attend such a conference if the area of applicability of CBM's can be clearly defined at Madrid. Undoubtedly, the need to preserve NATO solidarity and to retain strong European support for human rights at Madrid and the desire to present a unified Western front at Madrid contributed to the decisions of the Carter and Reagan Administrations to endorse this proposal.

The NNA's

The neutral and nonaligned states at Madrid have conformed to their traditional vital role, developed at Helsinki and Belgrade, as intermediaries between the East and the West. Their major goal is to ensure that the CSCE process continues because they view it as a means by which East-West tensions can be handled. Since the consensus rule provides each participating state with a veto, CSCE offers the NNA's a forum in which to enter the European security debate and deal with the superpowers and the other European states on an equal basis. Although differences exist among the NNA's, they have worked together fairly effectively to facilitate agreement among the states and, in particular, between the Eastern and Western alliances.

PHASE I: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

In this phase, the West, following American leadership, accused the East of several cases of failure to implement the Final Act, especially with respect to human rights. Since the West views détente as applicable not only to Europe and the superpower relationship but also to areas outside of Europe, the West charged that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated the Act's Declaration on Principles and undermined détente. Rejecting this charge, the Soviet Union argued that its troops had been invited into Afghanistan and that the Final Act did not apply because Afghanistan is not part of Europe.[5]

In contrast to Belgrade, where the Soviet Union and its allies responded vehemently to Western charges during the review of implementation, at Madrid they seemed prepared to accept Western criticism and made little effort to justify their actions or to respond to the substance of the charges. The Soviet Union may have concluded that its relative calm during the review phase would enhance its ability to achieve consensus on a European disarmament conference. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, generally known as the Helsinki Commission, reported that in spite of the sharp criticism directed at them by the West, the Soviets at Madrid generally characterized this phase as constructive.[6]

[5] The Soviet invasion and presence in Afghanistan violated several of the Declaration's principles including: I—sovereign equality, II—the nonuse of force, VIII—equal rights and self-determination, and X—fulfillment of obligations under international law.

[6] The Commission, which is composed of 12 members of Congress and three representatives of the executive branch, was created by Congress in 1976 to monitor implementation of the Final Act. The Commission and its staff have served on the American delegations at Belgrade and Madrid. In the staff's view, a "more thorough and candid review of implementation" was achieved at Madrid than at Belgrade.

PHASE II: NEGOTIATION AND DRAFTING

Key Issues

The key issues of Phase II are in the areas of security, human rights, and follow-up to the Madrid meeting. Reaching agreement on proposals in these areas has been difficult because both East and West link the issues.

A major Western objective at Madrid is to obtain new provisions in Basket III which would facilitate freer movement of people, ideas and information and to strengthen the position of the Helsinki monitoring groups.[7] The West has continually linked its attendance at a post-Madrid European security conference to Eastern acceptance of new proposals in the area of human rights. The East, however, has been unwilling to accept new obligations on human rights until the West yields on security. Linkage of these two issues has consistently deepened the deadlock of the meeting at various times in this phase.

The third major issue is the question of another follow-up meeting. Here again, linkage poses a problem. The West has promised unconditionally to attend a third follow-up. The East, on the other hand, has threatened to disrupt the CSCE process by withholding its commitment to attend until consensus is reached on a post-Madrid European disarmament conference.

PHASE II, 1ST SESSION (JANUARY 27–JULY 28, 1981)[8]

Before the Madrid meeting began, both France and the Warsaw Pact offered proposals for a post-Madrid conference on military security. These two proposals became the subjects of negotiation during the first session of Phase II.

At the spring 1978 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing called for the convocation of a two-staged European disarmament conference within the CSCE framework. Stage one would deal with confidence-building measures in Europe, and stage two would focus on the reduction of conventional arms and armies. NATO formally endorsed stage one of the French proposal at Ankara in June 1980 with three conditions: (1) that the conference be conducted "under the aegis" of CSCE, (2) that the CBM's be "militarily significant and verifiable" and "applicable to the entire continent of Europe" including all of

[7] As a result of Western insistence at Helsinki, human rights are incorporated in the Final Act in Basket III and in Principle VII, which states: "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, incldding the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief." The Act's explanation of this principle includes language which legitimizes the Helsinki monitoring groups. At Madrid, the West has sought progress in Principle VII and Basket III.

[8] Failing to make much progress on security and human rights issues, the delegates recessed on April 10 for an Easter break. It is sometimes argued that the period from May 5, when they resumed the meeting, through July 28 is the second session of Phase II.

This report assumes the Helsinki Commission's position that January 27–July 28 constitutes one session.

the European part of the Soviet Union, and (3) that the mandate for the conference be part of a "balanced outcome". The NATO nations have also insisted that CBM's be imbued with some reasonable commitment, i.e. politically binding.

In May 1979 the Warsaw Pact proposed a conference of the 35 CSCE states to reduce arms in Europe. The Pact's proposal, which was introduced at Madrid by Poland, calls for a conference to deal with security issues in stages beginning with consideration of CBM's. The conference proposed by the East would be continuous and, therefore, further removed from CSCE control than the conference proposed by the West. Unlike the Western proposal, the Eastern proposal does not define the area of applicability of CBM's.

Fairly early in the first session of Phase II, the states unanimously accepted the idea of a post-Madrid military security conference. The remainder of the session was devoted to developing a mandate. They agreed that the first stage of the conference would deal only with confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM's).[9] The question of a second stage was evaded because of fundamental differences among the states, and especially between East and West.

The East accepted all the Western conditions on CSBM's except their area of applicability. Disagreement over this issue has prolonged negotiations in the security basket throughout Phase II.

The United States and its allies argue that CSBM's should cover all of the European part of the Soviet Union to the Urals—a position to which the NNA's now subscribe. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is trying to retain the area of applicability as defined in the Final Act—that is, coverage only within the 250-kilometer zone along the western frontier of the Soviet Union.[10] Not until after the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1981 did the Soviet delegates at Madrid begin to show a willingness to consider the Western formula. However, they sought a corresponding move from the West in return.

Building upon a compromise formula offered by the NNA's on March 31, the NATO nations proposed in July that CSBM's cover the whole of Europe and military activities in the adjoining air and sea space around Europe that are an integral part of military activities on the continent of Europe. This formulation was offered by the West in return for Soviet acceptance of Europe to the Urals. The Western proposal was further conditioned by progress in other areas of the Act, especially human rights.

The Soviet Union rejected the security and human rights aspects of the NATO proposal and refused to accept the NATO formulation on CSBM coverage on the ground that it was a one-sided approach favoring the West. The Soviets reiterated their willingness to extend the zone to the European part of the Soviet Union in return for a corresponding move by the West. Although the Soviet delegates did not define what this move should be, they suggested that CSBM's should cover "the whole of Europe with the adjoining sea (ocean)

[9] The CSCE states adopted the term "confidence- and security-building measures" largely to appease Yugoslavia which had offered a proposal for a conference that would deal with CBM's in stage 1, security in stage 2, and disarmament in stage 3. At this juncture, the change in terms makes no substantive difference. In the longer term, however, the change could be significant if CSBM's constrain forces.

[10] In Basket I, the Final Act contains some five "classical" CBM's such as notification of major military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops.

areas of corresponding width and airspace, as well as, if it corresponds to the content of the measures themselves, the non-European participating states."

The West regarded the Soviet formulation as totally unacceptable because it encompassed large segments of the globe outside of the generally accepted limits of Europe and unrealistic since the conference was to deal with "European" security. As this session drew to a close, the question of defining European frontiers remained the key issue. In addition, since consensus could not be reached on all aspects of the mandate for the military security conference, the future of the CSCE process was still unsettled.

According to the Helsinki Commission, "modest progress" was made on human rights in this session. However, the East refused to agree to the Western demand for a post-Madrid experts' meeting on human rights (a precondition, especially, for American attendance at a military security conference). Other issues such as an experts' meeting on family reunification and additional language on Helsinki monitors, religious liberty, jamming and the treatment of journalists also remained unresolved at the end of this session. In the view of the United States and its allies, Soviet intransigence on these issues and on the area of applicability of CSBM's prevented the meeting from reaching a successful conclusion in this session.

In spite of the obstacles posed by the linkage of central issues, the delegates at Madrid achieved consensus on a number of substantive proposals by the end of the first session. In fact, negotiations on Basket II (economics) were successfully completed. According to Ambassador Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation, the states tentatively agreed upon 80–85 percent of the language of a concluding document by the end of July. This achievement plus the need felt by many European states to produce a new agreement at Madrid served as incentives to continue the meeting.

PHASE II, 2ND SESSION (OCTOBER 27–DECEMBER 18, 1981)

ATMOSPHERE

The United States joined most of the Western European and neutral and nonaligned nations in their determination to achieve a balanced concluding document by December 18 when the Madrid meeting was scheduled to end.[11] However, there was uncertainty as to whether this goal could be attained. The unresolved issues reflected fundamental differences between East and West. In addition, the extreme formulation on CSBM coverage offered by the Soviet Union in July raised a question about the sincerity of the Soviet position on a post-Madrid security conference. Despite these uncertainties, there was guarded optimism in the West during the late summer and early fall that the meeting could be ended successfully. This optimism began to fade, however, after the October session began.

Soviet violations of the Final Act during the summer and fall caused the West to return to a review of implementation.[12] While continuing to negotiate on the outstanding issues, Western delegates stressed that

[11] Originally, the meeting was scheduled to end on March 5, 1981. Unable to reach agreement by this date, the states continued the meeting and, as circumstances warranted, set new target dates for closure.

[12] Violations of the Act also increased in Eastern Europe, particularly in Czechoslovakia, in this time period.

the recent crackdown on human rights activists, the decrease in emigration, and the failure to notify on military maneuvers near Poland created obstacles to reaching agreement in this session.

Failure to achieve any movement on human rights or reach consensus on the area of applicability of CSBM's reinforced the skepticism that was growing in the Western delegations. Although the Soviet Union retreated somewhat from its July formula on the zone of applicability, it sought in this session to gain coverage of all sea and air space around Europe including areas of the Atlantic in which NATO maritime powers have traditionally conducted independent naval operations. The United States and its NATO allies opposed this proposal and refused to go beyond their July initiative. They also rejected the Soviet suggestion that the zone be decided at the CSBM conference rather than at Madrid. Because the West would not yield more on security, the East refused any further discussion on human rights proposals.

In contrast to its hard line at the negotiating table, the Soviet Union took a positive public attitude toward the Madrid meeting. Before and after this session began, the Soviet press reported on the many accomplishments of the meeting and suggested that there were no "insuperable obstacles" to reaching an agreement. In addition, the Soviet media emphasized that achieving results was more important than concluding the meeting quickly. The latter comment was most likely a negotiating tactic directed at the United States, which has consistently demonstrated its impatience at Madrid. Overall, Soviet press and media reports suggested that the Soviet Union continued to be strongly interested in a substantive agreement at Madrid and was willing to bide its time until this objective could be accomplished.

The Soviet strategy during this session was to prolong negotiations until the final hours of the meeting and to reach for agreement at the very end of the session. Undoubtedly, the Soviets hoped to benefit from the antinuclear/antiwar demonstrations in Europe and presumably calculated that the pressure on Western European governments to agree would increase as the meeting drew to a close. As consensus developed, the United States would find it increasingly difficult and costly not to support its NATO allies. No doubt the Soviet Union realized that it could not lose in this situation. If the United States closed ranks with its allies, the Soviets would achieve their goal of a post-Madrid military security conference. If the United States did not, additional strains would be placed on the NATO alliance—a development which would be advantageous to the Soviet Union in Europe.

The West has remained united in its demand that security be balanced by human rights in the concluding document. Some differences continue to exist, however, within the Western group and between the West and the East over what constitutes "balance". The American strategy at Madrid, particularly during this session, has been to avoid a definition of balance.[13] This strategy provides flexibility in negotiation and counters Eastern attempts to divide the United States from its allies.

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[13] The United States was able to employ this strategy because it was not pressed by its allies or the East to delineate its view of "balance".

In his November 18, 1981 speech on arms control, President Reagan stated that agreement on a European disarmament conference was "within reach" at Madrid and urged the Soviet Union to join the United States and other interested nations in achieving this end. Apparently the Soviet Union interpreted this statement as a call to compromise. A week or so later, Soviet President Brezhnev, in Bonn, echoed President Reagan's call for agreement but reiterated Soviet demands on the zone of applicability. Brezhnev's statement confirmed the Eastern position on this key issue.

When staff arrived on Monday, December 7, the meeting was still deadlocked over the security and human rights issues. Even the stepped-up efforts in the preceding weeks of the NNA's to mediate between East and West had failed to break the impasse. In the first part of this week, concern was expressed in the Western bloc that the delegates would be unable to reach an agreement by December 18, and discussion focused on what to do in that event. By mid-week a more optimistic attitude prevailed as the neutrals informally circulated a new proposal designed to bridge the gaps between East and West on security and human rights.

The Neutral Proposal

While the neutrals were completing their draft of a concluding document, their security text was shown to both East and West. The neutral proposal called for the convention of a conference, clearly within the CSCE framework, on CSBM's and disarmament to begin in 1982 or 1983. The first stage of the conference would deal with CSBM's which would be militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable. The neutrals defined the zone of applicability as the "whole of Europe with the respective adjoining sea area and air space." In the sea area and air space, CSBM's would apply only to those activities that are a "component part" of activities in Europe.

In general, the neutral proposal was well-received by the NATO delegations. It fulfilled the Western requirement for a direct relationship between CSCE and a disarmament conference, Western conditions on CSBM's, and the U.S. position that independent air and sea operations not be covered. The United States and its NATO allies argue that the area of applicability in the sea area and air space be defined functionally, according to the nature of the CSBM in question, rather than geographically, as the East contends. The neutral proposal incorporated the functional approach although not as precisely as the West wanted. After considerable discussion among the NATO military experts and the NATO heads of delegations, the decision was made to have the NATO contact group—the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway—negotiate with the neutrals in an effort to obtain some changes that would minimize Western concerns.

While the NATO contact group negotiated with the neutrals, the Soviet and American delegations held bilateral negotiations on the neutral proposal. The U.S. delegation has consistently argued that the Soviets need and want an agreement at Madrid to support their European peace initiative. Soviet activities during this week supported this contention. Soviet and Eastern European delegates stressed the

importance of reaching agreement by December 18 and of taking advantage of available opportunities, i.e., the neutral proposal. After receiving considerable pressure from the West, at all levels including Madrid, the Soviet Government granted permission to Liza Alekseyeva, daughter-in-law of Nobel Prize winning physicist and dissident leader Andrei Sakharov, to emigrate to the West. These actions supported the U.S. view that the Soviet Union would capitulate on its demand for coverage of independent air and sea maneuvers if the West continued to present a united front.

Although the West was favorably disposed toward the neutral security proposal, no final judgment could be made until the complete draft of the concluding document had been seen. On December 11, the neutrals informally presented their whole draft with the expressed hope that it would provide the breakthrough needed to bring the meeting to a successful conclusion.

Eastern and Western delegations caucused separately to consider the neutral draft. Discussions took place at several levels and within different groups in the Western bloc. For example, both the European Community delegations and the NATO delegations met on the proposal.

The Western allies differed somewhat in their assessments of the neutral draft. Some argued that it was unacceptable while others contended that it was the best agreement the West could get at Madrid. The prevailing opinion among the Western delegations was that the neutral proposal did not sufficiently meet Western demands on human rights and, therefore, was not a balanced document. The proposal provided for an experts' meeting on human rights and made some slight improvements in Basket III but failed to make an adequate reference to the role played by Helsinki monitors and other private individuals in the CSCE process, to provide for an experts' meeting on family reunification, or to mention the results of Phase I. The American delegation, in particular, found the proposal extremely deficient in the human rights area and unacceptable without further modification.

There was considerable disagreement in the Western bloc over how to deal with the neutral proposal. The neutrals had indicated that they would not table the proposal until December 16, the final week of the meeting. At that point, the pressure would be intense to accept the document. The United States argued that the West must remain united and press the neutrals to improve the human rights provisions before the proposal was tabled. Failure to do so would provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to try to shape the proposal to its advantage and the disadvantage of the West. If the Soviets succeeded, the proposal tabled on December 16 would be less acceptable than the original one. An opposing argument held that the neutrals would not bargain and that the West should accept this text, thereby protecting the neutrals from Eastern pressure for change. A third argument was that the West should accept the neutral paper because the Soviet Union and its allies would never agree to all of the Western demands on human rights.

The pace of activity increased as the week of December 7 drew to a close. Simultaneous discussions and negotiations were being conducted at several levels. The United States was meeting bilaterally

with the Soviet Union and with the neutrals.[14] The NATO nations were continuing their efforts to reach a common position on how to deal with the neutral proposal. On December 12, the day before staff left Madrid, the prospects for concluding the meeting with an agreement looked promising. The imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13 undermined these prospects and effectively ended meaningful negotiations. The last week of the Madrid meeting focused on the situation in Poland, and the only agreement reached in this week was to reconvene the meeting in February.

Western Unity

The Western states have presented a united front at Madrid despite differences over the desirability of a European disarmament conference and the extent to which the East should be pressed on the human rights issue. Unity has resulted for a variety of reasons. Like the United States, the NATO allies have been tough negotiators and have often taken the lead on key issues at Madrid. Their willingness to assume the leadership role on various occasions has not only contributed to unity by allowing the United States to step back from the spotlight but also created flexibility in negotiations with the East and the neutrals. President Reagan's arms control speech in November dramatically improved the atmosphere in the Western camp. In general, the Western Europeans regarded the speech as a sincere effort on the part of the Administration to take measures that would decrease tensions with the East and contribute to peace in Europe.

Delegates from the European Community and from the NATO states have continued the process, started at Helsinki, of constant consultation and coordination of positions and strategies. The NATO allies consult not only at the heads of delegation level but also within each of the working groups that deal with areas of the Final Act. The chair rotates alphabetically in the NATO heads' meetings. This procedural device reflects the sense of equality established among the NATO allies. It also, however, allows the United States to express its views without appearing to continuously dominate the group. The success of the NATO military experts in reaching common positions and the willingness of France, the original proponent of the disarmament conference, to defer within reason to the consensus established among the NATO allies has enabled the West to present an extremely solid front on security issues at Madrid.

The effective leadership of the U.S. head of delegation, Max Kampelman, has also contributed to unity. Under Kampelman, the United States constantly argued that Western states are "friends" and that the only way to achieve success at Madrid is to show the East a united

[14] The United States also met bilaterally with the Finns, who offered to formulate a security proposal that would supposedly support the Western position on the question of the zone and be acceptable to the Soviet Union. American security negotiators perceived the Finnish offer as an attempt at an "end-run" around the other NNA's which, if successful, would establish Finland as a major leader of the NNA bloc.

When informed by the United States of its negotiations with the Finns, the NATO heads of delegation agreed that Western interests could be served by the formulation that had been achieved. When the neutral proposal was tabled on December 16, it became apparent that there were differences between its security text and the United States-Finnish formulation. From the American perspective, Finnish negotiators offered a rather feeble explanation of why the joint effort had been violated. Western efforts to rewrite the security text were renewed but were inconclusive because of emerging events in Poland.

Western front. Kampelman's strategy has been effective both in dealing with the East and in retaining Western unity. There is great respect for him among the Western delegates. He is regarded as a tough negotiator. His effective and skillful negotiating techniques extend to his dealings with American allies as well. Kampelman's style and his determination to maintain Western unity have been important ingredients in the West's success, thus far, as Madrid.

The introduction of the neutral draft of the concluding document in December was the major test of Western unity in the current phase. Arguments offered in NATO caucuses reflected not only different assessments of the Soviets and of the neutrals but also differences in the interests and needs of the Western allies.

The European nations need and want a disarmament conference largely for domestic political reasons. In December, some of them were willing to sacrifice human rights to achieve this goal. The United States has not been confronted with large, popular, antinuclear/antiwar demonstrations at home as have many of its European allies. During 1981, there was considerable popular support for the Reagan Administration's defense policies. Unlike the European nations, the United States has channels outside of CSCE—mutual balanced force reductions, bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, intermediate nuclear force talks—in which to negotiate arms control agreements with the East and protect American security. Thus, there are no domestic or national security needs for the United States to sacrifice human rights for security at Madrid. Given that the attentive publics in the United States focus on human rights as the most important part of the Final Act, tremendous domestic political costs would be paid if the American delegation took this step.

The United States could possibly leave Madrid without an agreement. The United States already achieved its goal of having a balanced and thorough review of implementation during Phase I. In addition, the United States has returned to a review of implementation during Phase II whenever the East flagrantly violated the Act, especially in the area of human rights. Under the provisions of the Final Act and of the rules established by the preparatory talks for this meeting, the CSCE states cannot conclude the Madrid meeting until the date and place of a third follow-up is set. When consensus is reached on this issue, the second American objective will be attained. It is doubtful that American groups interested in human rights would object if the Madrid meeting did not achieve a substantive agreement. For most of these groups, forcing the East to comply fully with the provisions of the Final Act is more important than negotiating new obligations which the East will probably not fulfill.

The U.S. interest in reaching an agreement at Madrid stems largely from the need to maintain good relations with the NATO allies. The solidarity established among the NATO delegations at Madrid can spill over to other issues of concern to the Atlantic alliance. At a time when the Soviet Union and its allies would like to exploit differences in the Alliance, it is of vital importance that the United States work with the Europeans to achieve a goal which is of paramount importance to them. Whether the United States can achieve this end and still obtain its demands on human rights in the neutral document re-

mains a question because of the impact of the Polish situation on negotiations. In the future, it may be necessary for the United States to relinquish some of its demands in the human rights area if agreement is to be reached at Madrid.

The Value of the Neutral Proposal

Although the neutral draft of the concluding document was tabled on December 16, it was no longer the subject of negotiation. The central question during the final week of this session was the duration of the recess. Consensus was reached that the states would adjourn on December 18 and return to Madrid on February 9, 1982.

Had martial law not been imposed in Poland, the Madrid meeting might well have concluded in December with a substantive agreement. There was genuine interest among all the CSCE states in achieving this end and, as the last days of the meeting passed, there was considered pressure to accept the neutral document.

Between the end of the second session and the start of the third, the CSCE states had time to scrutinize the neutral proposal and establish demands for language amendments. While the proposal could serve as a starting point for future negotiations, it is doubtful that it will ever have the value that it had toward the end of the second session.

PHASE II, 3RD SESSION (FEBRUARY 9–MARCH 12, 1982)

There was no improvement in the Polish situation when the delegates returned to Madrid on February 9. During the recess, the NATO allies discussed a variety of options for handling this session. Ultimately, the NATO nations agreed that the foreign ministers would attend the February session to discuss the situation in Poland. In what appeared to be a strategy designed to split the Western allies, the East revealed its intention to return to Madrid to negotiate further on the neutral document. At the same time, the East warned that discussions of Poland would not be tolerated at Madrid. Poland even threatened to walk out of the meeting if its internal affairs were mentioned (but in fact did not carry through with this threat). Ignoring these warnings, the West and the neutral and nonaligned states returned to a review of implementation and used the Madrid meeting as a forum to express outrage over violations of the Final Act by the Soviet Union and Poland. The NATO foreign ministers delivered speeches in plenary during the first week of this session. Not since the signing of the Final Act in 1975 have a majority of foreign ministers of the CSCE states attended a session. Their presence at Madrid reflects the impact of the Polish crisis on the CSCE process.

The Soviet Union sought to continue negotiations, but the United States and its allies argued that "business as usual" could not be conducted as long as the situation in Poland remained unchanged. On Friday, March 5, the NATO delegations created an impasse in the meeting by refusing to agree to a working program for the following week.[15] With the neutral states acting as intermediaries, the East and

[15] All decisions on the working program—that is, on the scheduling for the plenary sessions and drafting group meetings—must be decided in plenary by consensus.

the West reached a "gentleman's agreement" on March 9. The West agreed that the meeting would continue through Friday, March 12. In return the Soviet Union and its allies agreed that the meeting would be adjourned on March 12 until the fall. On March 12, at the end of a long and acrimonious plenary session in which the East and the West accused each other of obstructing negotiations at Madrid and endangering the CSCE process, representatives of the 35 states agreed to adjourn the meeting until November 9, 1982.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

The United States and its allies have set no preconditions for returning to Madrid in the fall. The West intends to review the situation in Poland, Eastern compliance with the Final Act, and the health of the CSCE process. The result of this review will determine in large measure if agreement can be sought in the next session.

Even before the February session opened, the United States took the position that negotiations could not proceed at Madrid until three changes occur in the Polish situation: (1) martial law is lifted, (2) Lech Walesa and other political prisoners are released from detention, and (3) a dialogue is opened among all interested parties including Solidarity and the Church. The State Department has indicated that there is "no prospect" for a comprehensive agreement unless these conditions are fulfilled.

The international political climate has always had significant impact on the outcome of CSCE proceedings. It seems reasonable to project that the next session will not achieve results without major improvements in East-West relations, especially the situations in Poland and Afghanistan. Currently, there is little support for a concluding document containing only the date and place of the next follow-up meeting. However, an agreement to disagree may become the preferable alternatives to endless and inconclusive negotiating sessions in the future.

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